Empire Conquest-Chapter 725 - 36: Someone Else Pays the Bill

The Empire Military would never admit to "clearing inventory," especially when calculating war expenses. They reevaluate older cruise missiles at current purchase prices and include the costs of maintenance, effectively passing those bills onto other countries.

There isn’t much to say about this round of cruise missile strikes.

According to the report released by the Joint Force Headquarter later that day, a total of over 800 cruise missiles were used, achieving a 92% hit rate on targets, a 77% damage rate to targets, and an overall reliability of an astonishing 96%.

The key point is, there were no combat losses or casualties when using cruise missiles.

Although the public was skeptical of the Joint Forces’ battle report, no one could deny that after two rounds of attacks on the 6th, the Iraq Air Force had been effectively grounded by the Joint Forces. The Hussein Regime’s much vaunted air defense systems, after facing two consecutive rounds of intense bombings, were riddled with holes and could no longer protect Iraq’s airspace.

Of course, this is somewhat of an exaggeration.

During daylight on the 6th, the Iraq Air Force still launched several reprisals and claimed to have shot down a carrier-based aircraft of the Liangxia Navy.

Indeed, it was a "War-12A" ship-borne fighter.

According to the announcement from the Iraq Air Force, this battle occurred in the afternoon of the 6th.

At that time, two "War-12A" of the Liangxia Navy were bombing a convoy bound for Kuwait south of Basra when the Iraq Air Force responded aggressively. They dispatched two MG-25s to intercept and claimed to have shot down one "War-12A" with air-to-air missiles, forcing the other to jettison its bombs prematurely. It was due to the timely intervention of the MG-25s that the convoy was spared.

Following that, two "War-9B" from the Liangxia Navy arrived and locked onto the MG-25s with radar, so the Iraqi fighters did not risk pursuing the fleeing "War-12A."

However, both the Joint Forces and the Imperial Navy later stated that they had no aerial engagement with Iraqi fighters that afternoon.

Moreover, the aircraft active south of Basra at that time were a "Attack-6" Plane Group; there were no "War-12A" activities in the area.

As for the "War-9B" that intercepted the MG-25s, certainly there were many, but none had records of engagement with the MG-25s.

To put it simply, the Iraq Air Force was lying.

Naturally, propaganda always swings in favor of oneself. 𝒇𝒓𝙚𝒆𝔀𝓮𝓫𝒏𝓸𝙫𝓮𝓵.𝓬𝙤𝙢

Ding Zhennan returned to the command center in the evening, and the first thing the duty officer reported to him was the aerial battle southeast of Basra,

where indeed a "War-12A" was attacked and shot down by an Iraqi fighter.

The unfortunate ship-borne aircraft crashed into Boss Bay, and the pilot ejected and parachuted out in time, later being rescued by the helicopter that arrived on the scene.

Following orders from the Imperial High Command, the Joint Force Headquarter sealed off this information.

Regarding the details of the engagement, there were discrepancies compared to the Iraq Air Force’s announcements.

The Navy Air Force should not be blamed for this aerial battle, as the main responsibility actually lay with the Air Force.

At that time, "Zhi-8C" on patrol in the area detected the two MG-25s but did not take immediate action, such as dispatching nearby "War-11B" to intercept. It only warned the naval ship-borne aircraft conducting bombing missions in the area and then transferred command to the Navy’s Shipborne Early Warning Aircraft, still hundreds of kilometers away, and en route.

Later investigations showed that the commander of "Zhi-8C" issued the return order.

The reason was that the Early Warning Command Aircraft had been on patrol for 16 hours and had refueled in-flight, scheduled to return two hours earlier.

As planned, the Navy’s "Zhi-6C" was to replace it around 15:00, but "Zhi-8C" did not withdraw until past 17:00.

However, this is not the Navy’s fault.

At midday, the Navy had already announced issues, as three carriers in Boss Bay and the Mua Sea encountered difficulties while retrieving returning ship-borne aircraft, which delayed the recovery operations beyond the anticipated time, preventing the scheduled deployment of the Early Warning Aircraft for patrol.

The Joint Forces headquarter made adjustments based on this, and the Air Force was not uninformed.

Otherwise, they would not have refueled the "Zhi-8C" before 13:00.

It was because of this refueling that the "Zhi-8C" did not face an immediate need to return due to fuel shortage.

"Zhi-8C" still had 12 tons of fuel upon returning to the airfield, enough for another four hours of flight.

In fact, the difference was only 15 minutes.

The Air Force’s "Zhi-8C" turned to withdraw at 17:05 and shut down its radar, which had been in operation for 16 hours, around 17:15.

Later, the Air Force used the reason "radar operated for too long" to clear the "Zhi-8C" commander of responsibility.

The Navy’s "Zhi-6C" activated its radar at 17:30, approximately 250 kilometers away from the battlefield.

It was during these 15 minutes that the two MG-25s made their move, and from about 30 kilometers away, fired missiles at the two unsuspecting "War-12A." The lead aircraft turned first to evade, but the wingman reacted slower, was hit by a missile, and after flying southeast for about 50 kilometers, crashed into Boss Bay. The pilot ejected and survived before the crash.

Moreover, the aircraft that rushed to counterattack were not the Navy’s "War-9B," but the Air Force’s "War-11B."