Empire Conquest-Chapter 688 - 19: The Dragon’s Sky

Two squadrons of 16 fighter jets divided into four formations, each formation containing two pairs of two-plane formations.

In traditional aerial combat tactics, the two-plane formation is the standard lineup.

However, during the Boi War, the Empire Air Force discovered many flaws in the two-plane formation and took the initiative to adjust aerial combat tactics.

Among the several formation methods that emerged at that time, the most famous was the three-plane formation, with one lead plane and two wingmen.

According to statistics from the Empire Air Force, during the Boi War, three-plane formations accounted for sixty percent of the combat achievements, while traditional twin-strike formations accounted for less than twenty percent.

What’s more, the loss rate of three-plane formations in aerial combat was less than half that of two-plane formations. 𝚏𝕣𝕖𝚎𝚠𝚎𝚋𝚗𝐨𝐯𝕖𝕝.𝕔𝐨𝕞

The three-plane formation flourished during the Boi War, which was not unrelated to the traditional aerial combat model that primarily used machine guns and had nothing particularly special about it.

If anything, during the last great war, the three-plane tactical formation had already been applied more broadly.

This goes to show from one aspect that aerial combat tactics are determined by technology!

After more than a decade of development, especially the immature medium-range air-to-air missiles during the Boi War, had now achieved sufficiently good performance and reliability, exerting an enormous influence on aerial combat. The Empire Air Force also adjusted the aerial combat tactics according to this change.

Two-plane formations remained the basic unit of aerial combat, but now with added formation cooperation.

Under ordinary circumstances, two pairs of two-plane formations made up one tactical unit.

If the battlefield situation was more complex, for example, if the opponent had sufficiently advanced technical equipment, two tactical units were needed to operate in coordination.

This was also the main reason for the Air Force to set the squadron size to eight planes.

Just now, however, the opponent was not strong.

Another "War-11B" tactical unit was patrolling the east, near Boss Bay, responsible for keeping an eye on enemy planes deployed around Basra.

Such an arrangement was actually accommodating Li Tianling.

Don’t forget, Li Tianling had delayed a fair amount of time by returning his plane to King Khalid Military City, and therefore the tactical unit he commanded stayed in the west.

The "War-10B" squadron also divided into two tactical units, but they were flying at mid-to-low altitude and positioned slightly forward.

This deployment was related to the performance, or rather the deficiencies, of the "War-10B."

As a medium-sized fighter designed primarily for air supremacy, the "War-10" strictly adopted the energy-maneuverability theory that had been proposed at that time. Relying on a high-performance engine for a sufficiently high thrust-to-weight ratio, it aimed to maximize agility, i.e., enhance horizontal maneuverability.

As for other capabilities, the Air Force did not have excessive demands.

The "War-10" itself was the backup to the "War-11," a low-end product, and very cheaply priced, so it was unreasonable to demand too much.

The result was that the "War-10" became the first Empire Air Force fighter equipped with canard foreplanes and delta wings, and it obtained exceptionally good agility because of this.

If anything, its turning performance was unmatched among third-generation fighters.

Additionally, with the acquisition of large-thrust engines, i.e., on the "War-10B," the previously not very prominent vertical maneuvering performance also significantly improved.

However, the problems were equally prominent.

First of all, the internal fuel fraction was low, and the combat radius was short, so in most cases, it needed to carry three auxiliary fuel tanks to achieve sufficient range and loiter time.

The most direct issue this led to was the conflict between auxiliary fuel tanks and ammunition.

The biggest problem with delta wings was the inability to set too many heavy-load points, which meant relatively few underwing hardpoints.

Even more critical was that to achieve higher speeds, the "War-10" had a wing thickness of only 3%.

As a result, because the wing’s structural strength was not enough, it was unable to set tip hardpoints.

A mid-sized fighter with a maximum takeoff weight of over 22 tons had only 9 external mounting points, and those located on either side of the intake lip were equipment mounts, suitable for carrying navigation pods and designation pods weighing up to 150 kilograms, but unable to carry weapon ammunition.

That is to say, the "War-10B" had only 7 weapon mounts.

Normally, the three mounting points on the fuselage belly and on the inside of the wings were used to carry auxiliary fuel tanks, while the outward mounting points on the wings were used to carry light combat missiles.

Consequently, only the middle mounting points on the wings could be used for medium-range air-to-air missiles.

Although on the B model, they adopted a multi-rack, which in theory allowed up to 3 missiles per mount, in practice, considering the tremendous overload generated during maneuvers, at most only 2 missiles could be carried, and many pilots did not like the restrictions that the multi-rack placed on the flight envelope.

In addition, it was also related to the radar and electronic equipment.

If anything, it’s because the mounting capability wasn’t strong enough, and the Air Force never regarded the "War-10" as the main fighter for seizing air superiority, the highest demand being able to engage the enemy in a dogfight, hence the conservative nature of the electronic equipment.

The "War-10B" still does not have the ability to use the "KK-12A"!

It is not only the radar that is inadequate, but also the lack of data link equipment.

According to the tests by Li Tianling and his team, the "War-10B" was capable of firing "KK-12A" missiles, but could only use them as semi-active radar-guided missiles. To bring out the performance of this new type of missile, an improved radar and the implementation of the number 16 data link system was necessary.

Of course, this also had a lot to do with the "KK-12A" being relatively new to the forces.

If anything, only a few "Expeditionary Mixed Wings" equipped with the "War-11B" could use the "KK-12A," and other fighters, including other units’ "War-11B," did not have this capability. Even if efforts to promote it were increased, it would still take quite some time.